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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Space Applications Advisory Committee (SAAC) of NASA's Advisory Council
was asked by the Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications to
consider the most suitable future means for acomplishing space application
missions. To comply with his request SAACformed a Task Force whose report is
contained herein. In their considerations the Task Force looked into the
suitability of likely future spacecraft options for supporting various types
of application mission payloads. These options encompass a permanent manned
space station, the Space Shuttle operating in a sortie mode, unmanned
platforms that integrate a wide variety of instruments or other devices, and
smaller free fliers that accommodate at most a few functions. The Task Force
also recognized that the various elements could be combined to form a larger
space infrastructure.
Three mission areas are considered in this report: remote sensing of the
earth from space, satellite communications, and materials processing in the
space environment. The existence of other applications areas is recognized;
however, the three that are considered appear to represent the bulk of the
space applications traffic now and for some time to come.
This report summarizes the results obtained by the Task Force. It describes
the approach utilized, the findings obtained, their analysis, and the
resulting conclusions.
2.0 STUDYAPPROACH
Task Force members were chosen by the SAACChairman on the basis of their
experience and breadth of background pertinent to the subject of the study.
This background includes a detailed knowledge on the parts of various members
of spacecraft characteristics and capabilities, expertise in space
communications, and expertise in space remote sensing applications and data
management. In areas where knowledge was limited, information was requested
and obtained from three other SAACCommittee members who have considerable
background in materials processing or communications.
To further augment this background, fact-finding visits were made by some of
the group members to government agencies (NASA, OTA, and ESA) and aerospace
companies (Boeing, Fairchild, and Rockwell). Expertise was tapped dealing
with a wide gamut of spacecraft configurations and operations, including
small, low-cost, automated spacecraft; space servicing of spacecraft; leased
spacecraft; Shuttle Orbiter and Spacelab utilization; large space platforms;
and Space Station planning.
The group members then exchanged position papers stating each individual's
findings and/or observations. These papers were augmented by those requested
from the other consulting committee members. Finally, the group leader
integrated the contents of the individual papers as modified by discussion
among the group members.
3.0 FINDINGS
3.1 SPACECRAFTAND THEIR OPERATION
A. To date, most of the space flightsin supportof the NASA applications
programhave utilized small- to moderate-sizedunmanned spacecraftexcept for
a one-year period in the early 1970s when Skylab was active. In recent years
the Space Shuttleand Spacelabhave been used to obtain applicationsprogram
data during short, sortie-typemissions. The results have been good, with
valuableapplicationsdata and useful informationobtained in many areas.
Early failuresof spacecraftor instrumentshave significantlyaffected the
progressof programsin a few cases (e.g., Seasatand Landsat4). The impact
has been particularlysevere where backup spacecrafthave not been available.
B. Spacecraftsuch as those involvedin the Nimbusseries of meteorological
and environmentalsatellitesand the Seasat programhave incorporateda
substantialnumber (the order of six) of differentbut discipline-related
instruments. This grouping techniquehas proven valuablefrom the standpoint
of synergisticeffectsand has been cost effectivein most cases. The impact
of spacecraftfailureassociatedwith this grouping of instrumentsis
obviouslygreaterthan with simplerspacecraft.
C. Simple,low-cost spacecraftof the ApplicationsExplorertype, usually
involvinga single instrument,have also proven to be very useful (e.g., HCMM
and SAGE). This approach is adaptableto obtaininghighly specific
applicationsdata or to special purposemissions, for example,those requiring
particularorbits.
D. The spacecraft"bus" concept has been incorporatedto varying degrees in a
number of designs (Agena, Nimbus,Block 5, AEM, and MMS). The utility of this
approach has been hamperedin part by the unwillingnessof design-investigator
teams to compromiseoptimum designs. In some cases such spacecrafthave been
more capableand thereforemore expensivethan needed by the investigator
team. Nevertheless,past experienceindicatesthat this approachshould prove
economicallyattractive,and a number of organizationsare continuingto
pursue the bus conceptin both the USA and Europe.
E. Only one type of spacecraft,MMS, has been designedand flown with
provisionsfor in-orbitservicing,repair,and updating. One successful
repair mission involvingthis spacecrafttype has been accomplished. The
Space Telescopewill also have repaircapability. Studiesconducted by NASA-
GoddardSpace Flight Center and by the FairchildSpace Companyhave shown that
this approachto the extensionof useful life is both economicallyand
programmaticallyattractive.
F. Until the recentshuttle/spacecraftflights,there had been no significant
United States involvementwith manned space experimentationfor nearly a
decade (since the Skylab programterminatedin early 1974). Skylab experience
indicatesthat such human involvementwould be useful in servicingand repair
and in other kinds of endeavorscontributingto space applicationsmissions.
Such uses of people in space have not been adequatelystudied or well
documented. An added factor involvesthe rapid advance in robotic systemsand
artificial intelligencetechnology,which has the potentialfor alteringand
enhancingman-machinerelationshipsin space.
G. Considerableimprovementcan and should be made in the accommodationof
space applicationsexperimentson the Space Shuttlefrom the standpointof
accessibilityand cost effectivenessas well as in the use of availablehuman
resources. The ShuttleOrbiterand Spacelaboperationsduring sortiemissions
should be as close as possibleto those envisionedfor the Space Stationin
order to obtain early relatedexperience. These activitiesshould include
human involvementin servicing,repair,adjustment,and modificationof
spaceborneequipment.
H. If a space station is placed in orbit, it can increasethe effectiveness
of many elements of the applicationsprogram;however,becauseof the high
cost of accommodatingpeople in the environmentof space, the manned space
station program is not to be justifiedon purely economic grounds,but on
additionalconsiderationsbeyond the scope of this report.
I. Becausethe initialmanned elementsof the space stationwill operate in a
low-inclinationorbit, while remotesensing from space for global information
gathering requires near-polarorbits,this segmentof the space applications
programwill have to depend (at least initially)upon unmannedspace platforms
supportedby Space Shuttlesortieoperations,possiblyusing an Extended
Duration Orbiter. These polar platformsmay benefit from the use of hardware
elements that have commonalitywith the manned space station. Certainareas
of remote sensingas well as associatedtechnologydevelopmentand screening
experimentscan be conductedin the Space Stationin a low-inclinationorbit.
J. In the future,supportof earth observationsand other new applications
areas will involvean increasedemphasison geosynchronousorbit operations.
Therefore,reducing costs of operationsto and in geosynchronousorbit will
become increasinglyimportant.
K. In the longer term, certain types of applicationsmissionsmay involve
very large and flimsy space structuresin geosynchronousorbit. These
structureswould probablyhave to be assembledin space (in a near-zerog
environment). Directhuman involvementin such assemblyand checkout
operationswill likely be a necessity.
3.2 PROGRAMMATICFACTORSAFFECTINGSPACECRAFTDECISIONS
A. Over the past half dozen years, only two dedicatedNASA space applications
missions have been approved for development. This number does not include
Space Shuttle sortiemissions in low-inclinationorbits. This situationis in
sharp contrast to that of the precedingdecade when, on the average,about two
such dedicatedmissions were approvedeach year. One of the reasons for this
change is that currentmissions have become more complexand costly.
B. NASA has been unsuccessfulin attempts to establish,in conjunctionwith
other agencies,a major space flightprogram in supportof oceanography(such
as a Seasat follow-on),in spite of the importantaccomplishmentsof the first
Seasat prior to its failureand(_ spite of strong supportfrom many segments
of the oceanographiccommunity.
C. The operationalresponsibilityfor atmosphericand land remote sensinghas
been vested in NOAA. In the case of land remote sensing, NOAA has requested°
proposalsfrom industry for implementationof a commerciallysponsored
operationalsatellitesystem.
D. NOAA has launchedand continuesto launch a number of polar orbiting and
geosynchronousmeteorologicalsatellitesin order to assure continuityof data
pertinentto its operationalfunctions. NASA has obtainedagreementswith
NOAA to fly certain instruments"piggyback"on these satellites,but only on a
"space available"basis.
NASA has great difficultyin gainingapprovalof the space flightproposals in
satellitecommunicationsin spite of well defined,widely acknowledged
benefits to the user communityand to the communicationsindustryin general.
Althoughone such project,the Advanced CommunicationsTechnologySatellite
(ACTS),has been recentlyapproved,it is the first one in the last 15 years.
E. Althoughthe reductionin the level of activity in NASA space applications
missions may be caused, in part, by a generalreductionof supportwithin and
outside NASA, in the remote sensingarea, mission costs appear to be an
overridingfactor. Currentprogramsin earth observationshave space elements
costing roughlya third of a billiondollarsand the overall ground support
doubles that figure. This problemis compoundedby the additionof new
disciplinesand new user groups to the program.
F. Problemshave been encounteredwith the ground handlingand reductionof
data even in cases where spacecrafthave performedwell. These problems
involvethe timing of data availability,integrationof data bases, and the
like. This area has not been given sufficientfunding and programmatic
priority. Support during the early stages of a program is a particular
problem. The advent of substantialonboard processingmay alleviatethis
problemto some degree.
G. A considerableeffort is being made by commercial/industrialfirms to
undertakespace endeavorsthat go well beyond their historic involvementwith
governmentcontracts for the design,development,and productionof
spacecraft. These endeavorsincludecommercialsponsorshipin such areas as
spacecraft,space operations,and space research facilities. NASA could take
greateradvantageof these commercialinitiativesfor their potentialeconomic
and programmaticgains.
H. Most materials processingexperimentsat near zero g, other than those
using short duration rocket or aircraft flights,have been conductedto date
on manned missions. The high power, the large volume, and the retrieval
1The Navy has recentlybegun the Navy Remote Ocean SensingSystem (NROSS)for
which NASA will providean advanced scatterometer(NSCATT)instrument.
capabilitiesassociatedwith manned missionsmake such missions attractivefor
use in materialsexperimentation. The hiatus that occurred in the manned
program has resultedin few flight opportunitiesand even when materials
processingexperimentshave been conducted,the involvementof the astronauts
has been minimal.
I. Much of the NASA materials programis scientificin nature, reflectingthe
state of the art in most of the disciplinesbeing investigated.A few efforts
with commercialpotentialare also being pursuedand appear promising.The
NASA effort in this area ($20Mannually)is very modest in comparisonto the
effort in most other applicationsdisciplineareas.
J. In the last half dozen years, more commercialcommunicationssatellites
have been launched than the total of all other launches in the civil area.
Future NASA space activitiesare expectedto involvemultifaceted
operationsgoing well beyond the past unmannedapplicationsmissions. This
new approach, involvingsuch factorsas servicingand repair requires a much
broaderand deeper systems engineeringeffort than has occurred in the past.
4.0 ANALYSESOF FINDINGS
4.1 REMOTESENSING
Unless NASAprovides greater internal support, obtains greater external
support, and/or reduces costs of its remote sensing programs, only limited
experimental space program data can be expected in the future just as has, in
fact, occurred in the recent past. This situation is aggravated further by
the need to place a greater funding emphasis on the ground data handling and
processing part of the remote sensing system.
4.1.1 Near-Term Solutions
Severalapproachesto solvingthis dilemmaappear promising,some of which
NASA has already initiated. NASA is using the Space Shuttlefor the initial
evaluationof sensors. These effortsshould be increasedby providinggreater
accessibilityand flexibility. Unmannedspacecraftfor the sole purposeof
instrumentationor sensor evaluationshould be relegatedlargelyto low-budget
missions of the Explorerclass. In the past, this approach has producedvery
satisfactoryresults for both NASA and the investigators. Anotherapproach is
to fly sensorsas ancillarypayloadson a host spacecraft. We note that NASA
is doing this in conjunctionwith the NOAA polar Metsat program. Missions
flown by variousdefense agenciesmay also hold promisefor "piggyback"
payloads. Groupinga large number of instrumentson a large complex
spacecraftpurely for sensor evaluationpurposesshould be carefully
evaluated,especiallywhere there is no possibilityfor servicing,repairing,
or updating.
NASA should also stimulateand supportcommercialinitiativessuch as those
involvingleasingor other types of joint endeavorarrangements. This support
may serve a dual purposein helpingto initiateand sustaincommercial
initiativesin the operationalremote sensingarea.
4.1.2 Longer-TermSolutions
The foregoingstatementsare not meant to imply that integrationof a number
of mission-compatiblesensorson a single platformis not worthwhile. In fact
this approach is unquestionablythe longer-termway to go in the earth sensing
programusing such spacecraftas a multi-missionbus (e.g.the Multimission
Spacecraft,MMS) or a larger space platform. Becauseof differencesin size,
capability,and cost, the two types of spacecrafthave some dissimilarities,
but they also have many similar features. These two types of space systems
providecommon facilitiessupport both in space and on the ground,affording
significantpotentialcost advantages. Because of the high unit cost the
impactof any early failureis great; early wear-outand obsolescenceare also
concerns. These concernsdictatethat such future spacecraftshould be
repairable,serviceable,and amenableto updating, preferablyon orbit. The
interestsof the investigativeteams in these types of facilitiesshould rest
more with the scientificor applicationsphenomenaand problemsbeing
addressedand their relationshipto the data obtainedthan with the details
and performanceof individualinstruments.
Differencesdo exist betweenthe intermediate-sizedspacecraftbus (e.g. MMS)
and the larger space platform. These differecesare associatedwith the
perceivedsize and payloadcapability. The bus concept is intendedto include
more than one spacecraft,with a lower initialcapital investment,in support
of a programthat is more evolutionaryin character. A problemexists when
the spacingof individualstarts is such that a reasonablecontinuityof
productionis not possible. This situationhas been typicalof recent bus
experienceand many of the cost and programadvantageshave been lost.
However,even in the presentenvironment,the bus conceptis valuable because
it is a necessaryintermediaryto a larger space platformwhich involvesa
longer lead time and representsa large capital investmentin a very long-
lived space observatory.
Nevertheless,the larger space platformappears to supportthe longer-term
programneeds of the remote sensingcommunity in a cost-effectiveway. The
idea of obtainingsimultaneousearth data from a wide variety of disparate
sensors all registeredto a common referenceand tied to a common data base is
a good one and argues for proceedingin this direction. Indeed,critical
informationneeds associatedwith global habitabilityand the relatedareas of
atmospheric,ocean, and arctic conditionsare best supportedby this type of
system. If the platformapproachis taken as the next step in earth
observationsdata acquisition,its developmentneeds to be startedprior to
that of the manned Space Stationto minimize the data gap previously
mentioned. Even current instrumentdevelopmentsappear to be optimally
aligned with the platformapproach. For example, great flexibilitycan now be
built into a multispectralinstrument,enabling real time selectionof
spectral bands, IFOV spatialresolution,pointing,data rate, and the like.
Furtherstudiesappear to be needed to establishoptimum platformsizing.
Severalwords of cautionare in order in connectionwith this approach.
Developmentand space tests of the instrumentsin advanceof their
installationon the platformare highly desirableto assure that they will do
the job commensuratewith the overallcosts. The platformmust not be allowed
to become such a complicatedundertakingthat it largelyconsumes available
funds, has an undesirablylong developmenttime, and crowds out the instrument
activitiesthat make it worthwhile. Additionally,there is fear that the
process of integrationwith the platformcould, in view of current Space
Shuttleexperience,reach such a cost and complexitylevel as to close the
door to involvementof small,low-budget,experimentalactivitiestypicalof
those at the universitylevel. Accommodationof low-budgetactivitieswith
short developmenttimes may be criticalto the total successof the platform
concept. Furthermore,early proof of low integrationcosts for payloadson
the platform is of high priority. Perhaps Shuttlesortiemissions can be
designedto demonstratethis capability. All in all, the space platform,
although representinga large initialcapital investmentshould have a low
life-cyclecost in relationto what it can accomplish in data acquisition.
The high benefit cost ratio occurs as a result of its long life and the common
facilitiessupportthat it can provideto the varioussensor systems installed
on the platform. This is predicatedon the ability to provide servicing,
repairs,and updatingon a timely, practical,and cost-effectivebasis. The
size and number of such platformsis yet to be determined.
4.1.3 Use of People in Space in Support of Remote Sensing
The manned space station includesmany of the intrinsiccapabilitiesjust
discussed for the large space platformand has the advantageof direct human
involvement,but a number of significantdifferencesmerit discussion. The
manned elements of the initialspace stationare to be placedin a low-
inclinationorbit from which itcan providesupport to missions going to
planetaryand geosynchronousdistancesas well as to certainastronomy
missions. Obviously,under these conditionsthe space stationcannot provide
earth observationalcoverageat the higher latitudes,whereas a large space
platformin polar orbit can providecomplete global coverage,which is a
dominant user need in most programs. If the observationsare intendedto
involvesolely the tropicalor subtropicalregionsor deserts,the space
stationorbit is satisfactory. In fact, more frequentcoverage would be
obtained,and under varyinglightingconditions,as comparedwith the polar
orbiting platform.
In any event, the space stationshould prove to be very useful in the area of
technologydevelopmentand in the screeningof instrumentsto fly later on the
space platform. The human involvementin such activitieswould be beneficial
in terms of evaluation,adjustment,and management. The high overheadcost
associated with human presenceis recognized,but there are many reasons for a
Space Stationand the applicationsprogramshould be able to take advantageof
the human presencewithout an undue burden from this overhead. Other human
presencefactors, such as disturbanceor contamination,would have to be
evaluated in specificcases to determinethe utilityof the space station for
uses where such factorsare critical.
4.2 COMMUNICATIONS
Over the past decade more civil communicationssatelliteshave been launched
than the total of all other types;the great majority of these were commercial
endeavors. Because this trend is likely to continue,the futurecharacterof
communicationssatellitesmay be determinedmostly by decisionsmade in
industry. The expected STS/Centaurlaunch capabilityof 10,000-14,000Ibs.,
directly to geosynchronousorbit, is much greaterthan any communications
satellitecurrentlyin service. Industrialcompaniesin the businessof
building and operatingsuch commercialsatellitesjustifiablytake the
evolutionarylow-riskapproach,and it is not clear that any plan exists to
build spacecraftthat would requireeven full STS/Centaurcapability. In
order to lead the way to new opportunities,NASA on at least two occasionshas
proposed flight programsto demonstrateadvanced communicationstechnologyor
systems. These proposals,althoughbroadlysupportedby the overall space
communicationscommunity,have encounteredstrong oppositionby specific
industrialelementsbased on competitiveconcerns.
A futuristicarea of space platformdevelopmentinvolvesthe placingof very
large structuresin geosynchronousorbit. These structurescould take the
form of very large parabolicantennae,large mirrors or lenses,or very large
arrays. Their first uses are expectedto be in communications(such as mobile
systems),but eventuallythey would involveapplicationsin earth
observations,transmissionsof electric power to and from orbit, and
ultimatelythe generationof large amountsof solar power in space. Such
lightweight,flimsy spacecraftstructureswill not be readilydeployed in
geosynchronousorbit as a single unit. Assembly,adjustment,and checkoutof
the units in low earth orbit is a possibilityparticularlyif preciseoptical-
type surfaces are required,and providedit is feasibleto spiral such
structuresout to geosynchronousorbit under very low-g conditions. A space
station would be highly useful in performingsuch operationsonce it becomes
operational. NASA should initiatea technologydevelopmentprogramin support
of this area to providefor space evaluationsof these possibilities.
In the nearer term, considerationshouldbe given to servicingand equipment
replacementof geosynchronoussatellitesat the module level. At least one
study has been made that shows economicadvantagesmay exist. Operationsof
this nature would be accomplishedin a roboticmode, but may be supportedby a
space stationoperatingin low earth orbit.
4.3 MATERIALS PROCESSING
Only a limitedamount of U.S. experimentationwith microgravityin the space
environmenthas been possible. The first orbitalexperimentstook place in
the early 1970s on Apollo and Skylab. After a hiatus of nearly a decade,a
few experimentshave been conductedon the middeckof the Space Shuttleand
within the last year, furtherexperimentationhas taken place duringthe first
Spacelabflight under Europeansponsorship. _l of these experimentshave to
some degree shown promiseof providingnew insightsinto materialsand
processes (bothorbital and terrestrial)as well as applicationswithin
certain industriesas a result of experimentationin the near weightless
environment. In spite of this potential,the level of supportgiven this
programarea is exceedinglylow comparedto other applicationsareas.
Only limited insightshave been obtainedabout the kind of laboratorymost
suited to this work. The involvementof astronautshas been largelyone of a
switch thrower or in the conductof very rudimentaryexperiments,such as with
liquids floatingin the cabin. This presentstate of kno_edge, therefore,
dictates that one must still extrapolatefrom experienceobtained in earth-
based laboratories.
The feelingof researchersin this field is that the space material
laboratoriesshould be like their ground-basedcounterpartsto the degree
practical. First, the laboratoryshouldenable intimatehuman professional
involvementin the setup and conductof the experimentsand rapid examination
and testingof specimensonboard. The apparatusshould be amenable to
adjustmentand reconfigurationbased upon resultsof immediatelyprior tests.
Sizeable volume (thousandsof cubic feet) and power (tens of kilowatts)will
be requiredto supporta wide varietyof generaland special-purposeequipment
which must be readily installedor removedas required. Specialconsideration
to safety and environmentalcontrol will be necessary.
A dedicatedmodule attached to a Space Stationappearswell suited to the
natureof this research. It would draw upon other elementsof the stationfor
support, for power, habitation,heat rejection,general supplies,and the
like. For experimentsrequiringextremelylow levels of gravity, a co-
orbiting platformcould be employedas an adjunct to the attachedmodule.
Means for periodicvisits by experimentersto this platformfrom the Space
Stationshould be provided.
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Priorto the advent of the Space Station,materialsprocessingexperiments
should continue aboard the Space Shuttleand Spacelab and efforts should be
made to improvethe accessibilityto these craft for conductingthis kind of
research in as flexiblea fashionas possible. In addition,other interim
platformsor modulesmay be utilized for materials experiments. They would be
of the type which remain in orbit andwould be visitedby experimentersor
payload specialistsperiodically,using the Shuttlein a sortie mode. Some
such devicesmight afford sigificant stay times for human involvement.
If and when actual productionof materials in space takes place, such
activities would appear quite amenable to automation. Human intervention
would appear necessaryeven in these cases for purposesof adjustment,
reconfiguration,servicing,and repair.
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS
A. NASAshould review its space platform utilization strategy in the
applications area and state how such strategies enhance the applications of
other entities such as NOAAand industry. By so doing, NASAcould gain and
provide more support for its applications programs.
B. A well-balanced and aggressive applications program would utilize most of
the spacecraft types and operating modes presently being considered, but with
certain changes in emphasis. The unmanned, non-serviceable free-flyer will be
relegated in most cases to simple, small, low-cost spacecraft. The multiple-
instrument spacecraft will be upgraded to platforms affording servicing,
repair, updating, and growth.
C. Use of the Shuttle for checking out performance of sensors prior to their
installation on automated platforms appears to be a cost-effective way to
assure that the right kind of data will be obtained.
D. Future investigator activity will emphasize data integration, analysis,
and application rather than the technology of instruments, data systems, or
spacecraft. The investigators will have to accept some compromises in data
acquisition and system performance to obtain the advantages of the integrated
space platform.
E. Even though larger and more completely integrated platforms are
contemplated, the applications program should consider the use of smaller
platforms in advance of the Space Station. These could include platforms
developed under commercial or other auspices and made available through joint
endeavors, leasing, international agreements, and the like. On-orbit
servicing is a most important feature.
F. Development of the polar orbit platform, currently an element of the Space
Station program, should precede those elements of the space station intended
for use in low-inclination orbit. The polar orbit platform is critical to the
understanding of global habitability trends, ocean conditions, and other
serious environmental questions. It can also provide important Space Station
logistics experience, using the shuttle sortie mode.
G. Planning of Space Shuttle and Spacelab on-orbit operations must consider
strongly how to obtain the maximumexperience in a Space Station operational
mode so that the Space Station program can move out effectively once the
station capability is established in orbit.
H. The materials processing program can be adequately accommodated on
Shuttle, Spacelab, and ultimately the Space Station, provided considerable
improvement occurs in integration costs, accessibility, and operational
flexibility. Where low g-level disturbances are a problem, separate platforms
servicing the Space Shuttle or Space Station will be utilized. The materials
processing program does need expanded support in terms of general funding, as
well as facilities for accomplishing tests on board these craft.
I. The materials processing laboratory of the Space Station should be a
dedicated module which facilitates the onboard involvement of materials
12
scientistsand engineers. The design of this module should strive to obtain
the generalcharacteristicsand flexibilityof a ground-basedmaterials
laboratory.
J. Long range planningshould includea programdefining goals and technology
for very large structuresto be assembledin low-earthorbit and spiraledout
to geosynchronousorbit in supportof mobile communicationsand other
applications. In the nearer term, the possibilitiesfor servicingand
replacingequipmentaboard geosynchronoussatellitesshould be evaluated.
K. The Space Stationwith its associatedhuman space involvementshows real
promise for supportingthe applicationsprogramin the areas of space
servicing,assembly,technologydevelopment,and generallyin other activities
where it is impracticalor unrealisticto program preciselythat activity in
advance. The Space Stationwill provideoutstandingcapabilitiesin operation
support areas such as servicingassemblyand evaluation.
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